the bold use of government to serve human rights and dignity is not only a good thing, but a necessary thing. I believe the security of our country depends on idealism abroad -- the promotion of liberty and hope as the alternatives to hatred and bitterness. I believe the unity of our country depends on idealism at home -- a determination to care for the weak and vulnerable. . . ."
There in a nutshell is the language and philosophy that make traditional conservatives so uncomfortable: the idea of a messianist government; the advocacy of grand policies which have little hope of succeeding; the lack of any sense of proportion regarding what governments can and should do.
Cannon's review touches on many of the same themes I did in my post. Particularly interesting are these two paragraphs:
In fact, a subtle umbrage toward Reaganism seeps, perhaps unconsciously, from this book. Gerson never says why -- indeed, he never admits such heresy directly -- but eventually the reason reveals itself: Gerson doesn't have much truck with the government-is-the-problem wing of his party, a libertarian branch Reagan courted. Gerson cites only a handful of offenders by name. They include Hoover Institution economist Martin C. Anderson, who urged Bush to make the GOP plank more agnostic on abortion; Grover Norquist, who sought to stitch the Reagan coalition back together by defining conservatism as the "leave us alone" coalition; and former House majority leader Dick Armey, who thought "faith-based" initiatives sounded like a Democratic idea.
Being a Democratic idea is not, to Gerson, much of an insult. He finds today's party identifications artificial and the labels "conservative" and "liberal" insufficient. The world leader he lauds most (other than Bush) is Bono, and his admiration for Catholic social thought is so deep he feels the need to let readers know that doctrinal differences prevent his conversion from evangelical Protestantism. Translating such ecumenism into partisan politics is trickier; Gerson, who energetically uses the word "evil," believes the fundamental divide in America is between "moralists" and "relativists." The future coalition he has in mind consists of religious conservatives who take seriously the Christian's duty to the poor, plus the non-pacifist wing of the Democratic Party.
The two sets of italics italics above are mine. The first emphasizes that the evangelical break with traditional limited-government conservatives is calculated and deliberate - they have genuine disagreements with our point of view. The second reiterates the point I made yesterday, that the Huckabites are much more likely to make common cause with the left than with traditional conservatives.
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A few notes. To begin with, I hope I haven't given the impression in these past few posts that I consider the evangelical community as a monolithic block, all walking in lock-step. While I actually do believe there is more cohesiveness of thought among evangelicals than among most political blocks, there are some splits. Peter Wehner, also a former Bush staffer, has a terrifically interesting article in the current issue of National Review, titled "Among Evangelicals, A Transformation." The article describes the changes going on within the evangelical community among people under 30, who, while still being as pro-life as their elders, are much more likely to be moderate to liberal on other social issues. These young people are also looking for a break in tone and approach from "the hard-edged politics of the Christian Right." I can't find the article on-line yet at NRO but keep checking, or go buy the magazine. It is among these young people that Huckabee will be finding most of his support among evangelicals. I imagine some of the older crowd feel as uncomfortable as I do with "Heroic Conservatism".
Demographics also help explain why conservatism has such a tough road to hoe among the general population. Michael Barone, who knows more about American political history than anyone alive, talks about it in his latest column. Read the whole thing here but I'll excerpt the section that is relevant to my point:
...the preference for smaller rather than larger government is not as ample as it used to be. The strongest case against big government has been its failures in the 1970s, typified by gas lines and stagflation. But the median-age voter in 2008 was born around 1964, so he or she never sat in those gas lines or struggled to pay rising bills with a paycheck eroded by inflation. That demographic factor helps explain why Democrats today are promising big-government programs, unlike Bill Clinton in 1992, when the median-age voter remembered the 1970s very well.
Taking it all into consideration - the demographic changes, the splits in the Reaganite coalition, the perceived policy failures of the current Republican administration - it's hard not to conclude that the conservative moment in America is over.
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